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The Moral Wager : Evolution and Contract / by Malcolm Murray.

Por: Colaborador(es): Tipo de material: TextoTextoSeries Philosophical Studies Series ; 108Editor: Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2007Descripción: Ix, 241 páginas recurso en líneaTipo de contenido:
  • texto
Tipo de medio:
  • computadora
Tipo de portador:
  • recurso en línea
ISBN:
  • 9781402058554
Formatos físicos adicionales: Edición impresa:: Sin títuloClasificación LoC:
  • BJ1-1725
Recursos en línea:
Contenidos:
Irrealism -- Against Moral Categoricity -- Self-Interest -- Rationality’s Failure -- Evolutionary Fit -- Consent Theory -- Concerned Parties -- Suffering and Indifference.
Resumen: This book illuminates and sharpens moral theory, by analyzing the evolutionary dynamics of interpersonal relations in a variety of games. We discover that successful players in evolutionary games operate as if following this piece of normative advice: Don't do unto others without their consent. From this advice, some significant implications for moral theory follow. First, we cannot view morality as a categorical imperative. Secondly, we cannot hope to offer rational justification for adopting moral advice. This is where Glaucon and Adeimantus went astray: they wanted a proof of the benefits of morality in every single case. That is not possible. Moral constraint is a bad bet taken in and of itself. But there is some good news: moral constraint is a good bet when examined statistically.
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Springer eBooks

Irrealism -- Against Moral Categoricity -- Self-Interest -- Rationality’s Failure -- Evolutionary Fit -- Consent Theory -- Concerned Parties -- Suffering and Indifference.

This book illuminates and sharpens moral theory, by analyzing the evolutionary dynamics of interpersonal relations in a variety of games. We discover that successful players in evolutionary games operate as if following this piece of normative advice: Don't do unto others without their consent. From this advice, some significant implications for moral theory follow. First, we cannot view morality as a categorical imperative. Secondly, we cannot hope to offer rational justification for adopting moral advice. This is where Glaucon and Adeimantus went astray: they wanted a proof of the benefits of morality in every single case. That is not possible. Moral constraint is a bad bet taken in and of itself. But there is some good news: moral constraint is a good bet when examined statistically.

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