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008 | 150903s2005 xxu| o |||| 0|eng d | ||
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_a9780387229751 _9978-0-387-22975-1 |
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024 | 7 |
_a10.1007/b100254 _2doi |
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035 | _avtls000329835 | ||
039 | 9 |
_a201509031106 _bVLOAD _c201405070451 _dVLOAD _c201401311320 _dstaff _c201401311145 _dstaff _y201401291441 _zstaff _wmsplit0.mrc _x257 |
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050 | 4 | _aBF81-107.L4 | |
100 | 1 |
_aHibberd, Fiona J. _eautor _9300433 |
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245 | 1 | 0 |
_aUnfolding Social Constructionism / _cby Fiona J. Hibberd. |
264 | 1 |
_aBoston, MA : _bSpringer US, _c2005. |
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300 |
_aXVIII, 207 páginas, _brecurso en línea. |
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_atexto _btxt _2rdacontent |
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_acomputadora _bc _2rdamedia |
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_arecurso en línea _bcr _2rdacarrier |
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_aarchivo de texto _bPDF _2rda |
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490 | 0 | _aHistory and Philosophy of Psychology | |
500 | _aSpringer eBooks | ||
505 | 0 | _aSocial Constructionism as a Metatheory of Psychological Science -- Relativism and Self-Refutation -- Non-Factualism -- The Received View of Logical Positivism and Its Relationship to Social Constructionism -- Conventionalism -- Meaning as Use -- Phenomenalism and Its Analogue -- Conclusions and Speculations. | |
520 | _aThis book examines social constructionism as a metatheory of psychology. It does not consider constructionist accounts of psycho-social phenomena, but it does assess certain assumptions which are said to underpin those accounts, assumptions which are primarily semantic and epistemological. The first part of the book explains why the charges of relativism and self-refutation leveled at social constructionism miss their target, and it considers a constructionist attempt to defend the metatheory by appropriating the concept of performative utterances. The second part of the book challenges the generally accepted view that social constructionism is antithetical to positivist philosophy of science. This is done via an examination of the doctrine of conventionalism, constitutive relations, dualism, Wittgenstein's meaning-as-use thesis, verificationism, operationism, linguistic phenomenalism, and Kant's limitations of human knowledge. It is shown that, in certain respects, these topics unite social constructionism with its bête noire logical positivism, and that psychology's repeated endorsement of these ideas hinders the development of a rigorous psycho-social science. The book ends with a brief, speculative section in which it is suggested that the skepticism and internalism of social constructionist metatheory is an unconscious strategy of survival against failure. Fiona J. Hibberd is lecturer in the School of Psychology, University of Sydney. She specializes in the history, theory and philosophy of psychology, and in theories of personality, and has published in theoretical journals in the social sciences. | ||
590 | _aPara consulta fuera de la UANL se requiere clave de acceso remoto. | ||
710 | 2 |
_aSpringerLink (Servicio en línea) _9299170 |
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776 | 0 | 8 |
_iEdición impresa: _z9780387229744 |
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_uhttp://remoto.dgb.uanl.mx/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/b100254 _zConectar a Springer E-Books (Para consulta externa se requiere previa autentificación en Biblioteca Digital UANL) |
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