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001			280693
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008			150903s2011 xxu| o |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9780387981710 _99780387981710
024	7		_a10.1007/9780387981710 _2doi
035			_avtls000333450
039		9	_a201509030232 _bVLOAD _c201404130440 _dVLOAD _c201404092230 _dVLOAD _y201402041111 _zstaff
040			_aMX-SnUAN _bspa _cMX-SnUAN _erda
050		4	_aJA1-92
100	1		_aDougherty, Keith L. _eautor _9305803
245	1	4	_aThe Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design / _cby Keith L. Dougherty, Julian Edward.
264		1	_aNew York, NY : _bSpringer New York, _c2011.
300			_axii, 120 páginas _brecurso en línea.
336			_atexto _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputadora _bc _2rdamedia
338			_arecurso en línea _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_aarchivo de texto _bPDF _2rda
490	0		_aStudies in Public Choice, _x0924-4700 ; _v20
500			_aSpringer eBooks
505	0		_aIntroduction -- Original Theories and Current Studies -- Clarifying Concepts -- Constitutional Decision Making -- Legislative Decision Making -- Electoral Decision Making -- Conclusion.
520			_aBuchanan and Tullock’s seminal work, The Calculus of Consent, linked economic methodology to substantive questions in political science. Among the major contributions of their book is a connection between constitutional decision making and contractarianism, a philosophical tradition that proponents believe can give institutions legitimacy. In other words, a major contribution of their book is a clear connection between empirical decision making and normative principles. The current book formalizes and extends their foundational ideas as it attempts to show how economic and philosophical arguments about the "best" voting rules can be used to improve constitutional design. It informs debates about constitutional political economy in comparative politics, democratic theory, and public choice. Political scientists often ask questions about what causes a nation to seek a new constitution, how constitutions are made, and what factors allow for corrupt decision making. The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design bridges the gap between normative questions about which institutions are most efficient and fair and empirical questions about how constitutions are formed. This provides a benchmark to help create better constitutions and informs empirical research about what institutions are most likely to succeed. The book begins by showing how contractarian ideals can be used to justify choices about decision-making. It then carefully defines several concepts employed by Buchanan and Tullock and shows why the relationships between these concepts may not be as closely linked as Buchanan and Tullock first thought. This provides a backdrop for analyzing the three phases of constitutional decision-making: 1) the constitutional phase, where rules for constitutional decision making must be justified; 2) the legislative phase, where the optimal k-majority rule is analyzed; and 3) the electoral phase, where the optimal voting rule for large electorates and open alternatives are determined. These phases differ by context and sources of legitimacy. Computational models and analytic techniques are introduced in each of these chapters. Finally, the book concludes with statements about the significance of the research for the creation of constitutions more broadly.
590			_aPara consulta fuera de la UANL se requiere clave de acceso remoto.
700	1		_aEdward, Julian. _eautor _9305804
710	2		_aSpringerLink (Servicio en línea) _9299170
776	0	8	_iEdición impresa: _z9780387981703
856	4	0	_uhttp://remoto.dgb.uanl.mx/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-98171-0 _zConectar a Springer E-Books (Para consulta externa se requiere previa autentificación en Biblioteca Digital UANL)
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999			_c280693 _d280693