000			04660nam a22003735i 4500
001			281440
003			MX-SnUAN
005			20160429154106.0
007			cr nn 008mamaa
008			150903s2006 ne | o |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9781402039775 _99781402039775
024	7		_a10.1007/1402039778 _2doi
035			_avtls000334576
039		9	_a201509030215 _bVLOAD _c201404120813 _dVLOAD _c201404090552 _dVLOAD _y201402041152 _zstaff
040			_aMX-SnUAN _bspa _cMX-SnUAN _erda
050		4	_aB65
100	1		_aRainbolt, George W. _eautor _9307125
245	1	4	_aThe Concept of Rights / _cby George W. Rainbolt.
264		1	_aDordrecht : _bSpringer Netherlands, _c2006.
300			_axv, 253 páginas _brecurso en línea.
336			_atexto _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputadora _bc _2rdamedia
338			_arecurso en línea _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_aarchivo de texto _bPDF _2rda
490	0		_aLaw and Philosophy Library, _x1572-4395 ; _v73
500			_aSpringer eBooks
505	0		_aRights and Hohfeldian Analysis -- Normative Constraints -- Deontic and Alethic Concepts -- The Relational Nature of Rights -- Rights, Reasons, and Persons -- Rights Conflict -- Right Holders: Present -- Right Holders: Past and Future -- A Final Comparison.
520			_aWhat is it to have a right? Previous answers to this question can be divided into two groups. Some (e.g., Joseph Raz) hold interest/benefit theories of rights while others (e.g., H.L.A. Hart and Carl Wellman) hold choice/will theories of rights. The Concept of Rights defends an alternative to both of the traditional views, the justified-constraint theory of rights. On this view, a person has a right if and only if a feature of that person is a sound justification for others to have a particular sort of normative constraint. The justified-constraint theory avoids the problems which have bedeviled the interest/benefit theories and the choice/will theories. It also solves the puzzle of the relational nature of rights. On the justified-constraint view, an obligation correlative to a right is to the right-holder when it is a feature of the right-holder that justifies the obligation. The analysis also shows that, as far as the concept of rights is concerned, any sort of individual or group can have rights. The limits on what sorts of things have rights are substantive, not conceptual. Moreover, the justified-constraint solves the problem of the rights of past and future generations. It is a theory which applies, without modification, to past, present and future beings. "With clear exposition, powerful argument and informed incisive critisms of alternative theories, this book gives a systematic account of an original and important alternative to the best theories of rights in the recent literature." Carl Wellman, Washington University, St Louis, USA "The Concept of Rights is a valuable contribution to the literature on rights. Theorists too frequently propose something like a definition of rights and argue from the definition to controversial, substantive conclusions. Rainbolt avoids this mistake with an analysis of rights as justified, relational constraints. This theory gives an account of what is distinctive about rights without begging theoretical questions; he properly leaves these to normative theory. Rainbolt writes clearly and decisively. Readers may not agree with him, but there will be little doubt about where he stands. This is no small virtue." William Nelson, University of Houston, Texas, USA "More systematic, nuanced, and sophisticated than almost all other (Hohfeldian and neo-Hohfeldian analyses of rights talk). His peer in this regard is perhaps Judith Jarvis Thomson." Richard Arneson, University of California at San Diego, USA "The most sophisticated [Hohfeldian rights analysis] I have seen." David Schmidtz, University of Arizona, Tucson, USA "First-rate book, the best thing on the subject since Sumner and Thomson's books fifteen to twenty years ago." Christopher W. Morris, University of Maryland, College Park, USA "Advances the positions of Joseph Raz and H.L.A. Hart, perhaps the two most important legal philosophers of the last century" Douglas Husak, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, USA
590			_aPara consulta fuera de la UANL se requiere clave de acceso remoto.
710	2		_aSpringerLink (Servicio en línea) _9299170
776	0	8	_iEdición impresa: _z9781402039768
856	4	0	_uhttp://remoto.dgb.uanl.mx/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3977-8 _zConectar a Springer E-Books (Para consulta externa se requiere previa autentificación en Biblioteca Digital UANL)
942			_c14
999			_c281440 _d281440