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020 _a9780387877679
_99780387877679
024 7 _a10.1007/9780387877679
_2doi
035 _avtls000333192
039 9 _a201509030214
_bVLOAD
_c201404130352
_dVLOAD
_c201404092141
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040 _aMX-SnUAN
_bspa
_cMX-SnUAN
_erda
100 1 _aBier, Vicki M.
_eeditor.
_9308030
245 1 0 _aGame Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats /
_cedited by Vicki M. Bier, M. Naceur Azaiez.
264 1 _aBoston, MA :
_bSpringer US,
_c2009.
300 _avI, 242 páginas 46 ilustraciones
_brecurso en línea.
336 _atexto
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputadora
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _arecurso en línea
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _aarchivo de texto
_bPDF
_2rda
490 0 _aInternational Series in Operations Research & Management Science,
_x0884-8289 ;
_v128
500 _aSpringer eBooks
505 0 _aWhy Both Game Theory and Reliability Theory Are Important in Defending Infrastructure against Intelligent Attacks -- Game Theory Models of Intelligent Actors in Reliability Analysis: An Overview of the State of the Art -- Optimizing Defense Strategies for Complex Multi-State Systems -- Defending Against Terrorism, Natural Disaster, and All Hazards -- A Bayesian Model for a Game of Information in Optimal Attack/Defense Strategies -- Search for a Malevolent Needle in a Benign Haystack -- Games and Risk Analysis: Three Examples of Single and Alternate Moves -- Making Telecommunications Networks Resilient against Terrorist Attacks -- Improving Reliability through Multi-Path Routing and Link Defence: An Application of Game Theory to Transport.
520 _aGame Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats introduces reliability and risk analysis in the face of threats by intelligent agents. More specifically, game-theoretic models will be developed for identifying optimal and/or equilibrium defense and attack strategies in systems of varying degrees of complexity. The book covers applications to networks, including problems in both telecommunications and transportation. However, the book’s primary focus is to integrate game theory and reliability methodologies into unified techniques to predict, detect, diminish, and stop intentional attacks at targets that vary in complexity. In this book, leading researchers combine reliability and risk analysis with game theory methods to create a set of functional tools that can be used by security personnel to offset intentional, intelligent threats (including the threats of terrorism and war). This means a comprehensive treatment of such problems must consider two aspects: (1) the structure of the system to be protected and (2) the adaptive nature of the threat (that is, beyond the static nature of the threat). The book provides a set of scientific tools for analyzing and applying game-theoretic reliability problems in the presence of intentional, intelligent threats. These scientific tools address problems of global safety and create more cost-effective defensive investments.
590 _aPara consulta fuera de la UANL se requiere clave de acceso remoto.
700 1 _aAzaiez, M. Naceur.
_eeditor.
_9308031
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Servicio en línea)
_9299170
776 0 8 _iEdición impresa:
_z9780387877662
856 4 0 _uhttp://remoto.dgb.uanl.mx/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-87767-9
_zConectar a Springer E-Books (Para consulta externa se requiere previa autentificación en Biblioteca Digital UANL)
942 _c14
999 _c281892
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