000			03812nam a22003615i 4500
001			282083
003			MX-SnUAN
005			20160429154133.0
007			cr nn 008mamaa
008			150903s2007 ne | o |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9781402058790 _99781402058790
024	7		_a10.1007/9781402058790 _2doi
035			_avtls000335382
039		9	_a201509030237 _bVLOAD _c201404300300 _dVLOAD _y201402041259 _zstaff
040			_aMX-SnUAN _bspa _cMX-SnUAN _erda
050		4	_aK3154-3370
100	1		_aÁvila, Humberto. _eeditor. _9308410
245	1	0	_aTheory of Legal Principles / _cedited by Humberto Ávila.
264		1	_aDordrecht : _bSpringer Netherlands, _c2007.
300			_axiv, 150 páginas _brecurso en línea.
336			_atexto _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputadora _bc _2rdamedia
338			_arecurso en línea _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_aarchivo de texto _bPDF _2rda
490	0		_aLaw and Philosophy Library, _x1572-4395 ; _v81
500			_aSpringer eBooks
520			_aThis book intends to help understand and apply principles and rules better. Its target is to keep the distinction between principles and rules whereas structuring it on different foundations than those jurisprudence ordinarily employs. The first object of investigation is the phenomenon of interpretation in Law in order to understand that the classification of certain normative species as either principles or rules depends in the first place on axiological connections that are not ready prior to the interpretation process that unveils them. Then, a definition of principles is proposed, aiming to understand what their unique characteristics are when compared to other norms of the legal order. Thirdly, the conditions for the application of principles and rules are examined, which are the normative applicative postulates. It will be shown, on one hand, that principles not only explicit values, but also set forth precise species of behaviors, though indirectly; on the other hand, the creation of conducts by rules is also to be weighed, even though the behavior set forth in advance may be overcome, depending on the accomplishment of a few requirements. That will surpass both the mere praise of values, which does not create behaviors, and the automatic application of rules. A model is proposed to explain the normative species, which includes structured weighing on the application process while encompassing substantive criteria of justice in its argument, through the analytical reconstruction of the concrete use of normative postulates, especially those of reasonableness and proportionality. All of that is done with a focus on the ability of intersubjective control of the argumentation, which often degenerates into capricious decisionism. "Although there are books about legal rules, and although the role of legal principles has been a focus of legal theory since Dworkin, there has yet to be a serious systematic study of what legal principles are, where they come from, how they are identified, and how precisely they intersect with other sources in legal argument and legal decision-making. Professor Avila's much-needed book fills this gap with rigor, depth, and creativity, and it should become essential reading for anyone interested in legal reasoning and legal argumentation." Frederick Schauer, John F Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, USA
590			_aPara consulta fuera de la UANL se requiere clave de acceso remoto.
710	2		_aSpringerLink (Servicio en línea) _9299170
776	0	8	_iEdición impresa: _z9781402058783
856	4	0	_uhttp://remoto.dgb.uanl.mx/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5879-0 _zConectar a Springer E-Books (Para consulta externa se requiere previa autentificación en Biblioteca Digital UANL)
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999			_c282083 _d282083