000 03692nam a22003735i 4500
001 282388
003 MX-SnUAN
005 20160429154148.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 150903s2006 ne | o |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9781402042836
_99781402042836
024 7 _a10.1007/1402042833
_2doi
035 _avtls000334701
039 9 _a201509030248
_bVLOAD
_c201404120834
_dVLOAD
_c201404090613
_dVLOAD
_y201402041155
_zstaff
040 _aMX-SnUAN
_bspa
_cMX-SnUAN
_erda
050 4 _aB65
100 1 _aMichelon, Cláudio.
_eautor
_9309031
245 1 0 _aBeing Apart from Reasons :
_bThe Role of Reasons in Public and Private Moral Decision-Making /
_cby Cláudio Michelon.
264 1 _aDordrecht :
_bSpringer Netherlands,
_c2006.
300 _ax, 189 páginas
_brecurso en línea.
336 _atexto
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputadora
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _arecurso en línea
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _aarchivo de texto
_bPDF
_2rda
490 0 _aLaw and Philosophy Library,
_x1572-4395 ;
_v76
500 _aSpringer eBooks
505 0 _aMORAL ACTION, REASON AND INCLINATION -- REASONING IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CONTEXTS -- NEUTRALIST PUBLIC LIBERALISM AND THE INSULATION OF THE RIGHT FROM THE GOOD -- LEGAL AND NON-LEGAL REASONS IN THE COMMON GROUND OF DELIBERATION -- THE PROCEDURAL VALUE OF LAW AND THE INSULATION BETWEEN LEGAL AND MORAL REASONS FOR ACTION -- CONCLUSION.
520 _aBeing Apart from Reasons deals with the question of how we should go about using reasons to decide what to do. More particularly, the book presents objections to the most common response given by contemporary legal and political theorists to the moral complexity of decision-making in modern societies, namely: the attempt to release public agents from their argumentative burden by insulating a particular set of reasons from the general pool of reasons and assigning the former systematic priority over all other reasons. If those attempts succeed, public agents should not reason comprehensively, taking into account all reasons and weighing them against one another. Some reasons would be excluded from decision-making by kind. That strategy is apparent both in Rawls’ claim that reasons concerning the right are systematically prior to reasons concerning the good and in Raz’s claim that pre-emptive reasons are systematically prior to first-order reasons. The same strategy is also instantiated by certain arguments for the procedural value of law, such as Jeremy Waldron’s. In the book, each of those arguments for the insulation of reasons is objected to in order to defend the thesis the reasoning by public agents must always be as comprehensive as possible. In order to reach that conclusion a particular picture of public decision-making is needed. That picture is provided by the comparison between the use of reasons in public and private decision-making which is carried out in the first two chapters of the book. That comparison brings to light peculiar features of public decision-making that imply the need for public agents to reason comprehensively before deciding. The remaining chapters object to those arguments mentioned above which aim at justifying the exclusion of certain reasons from public agents' decision-making.
590 _aPara consulta fuera de la UANL se requiere clave de acceso remoto.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Servicio en línea)
_9299170
776 0 8 _iEdición impresa:
_z9781402042829
856 4 0 _uhttp://remoto.dgb.uanl.mx/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-4283-3
_zConectar a Springer E-Books (Para consulta externa se requiere previa autentificación en Biblioteca Digital UANL)
942 _c14
999 _c282388
_d282388