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001			282644
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008			150903s2007 ne | o |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9781402059612 _99781402059612
024	7		_a10.1007/9781402059612 _2doi
035			_avtls000335416
039		9	_a201509030748 _bVLOAD _c201404300301 _dVLOAD _y201402041300 _zstaff
040			_aMX-SnUAN _bspa _cMX-SnUAN _erda
050		4	_aBD143-237
100	1		_aNottelmann, Nikolaj. _eautor _9309541
245	1	0	_aBlameworthy Belief : _bA Study in Epistemic Deontologism / _cby Nikolaj Nottelmann.
264		1	_aDordrecht : _bSpringer Netherlands, _c2007.
300			_brecurso en línea.
336			_atexto _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputadora _bc _2rdamedia
338			_arecurso en línea _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_aarchivo de texto _bPDF _2rda
490	0		_aSynthese Library ; _v338
500			_aSpringer eBooks
505	0		_aBelief and Acceptance -- Approaching a Conception of Epistemic Blameworthiness -- Blameworthy Belief as Inexcusably Undesirable Belief -- Epistemic Undesirability -- Bruce Russell's Basic Analysis of the Notion of Epistemic Blameworthiness -- Doxastic Control -- Direct Content-Directed Doxastic Control or Doxastic Voluntarism -- Direct Property-Directed Doxastic Control or Property Voluntarism -- Indirect Content-Directed Doxastic Control or Doxastic Pascalianism -- Indirect Property-Directed Doxastic Control or Property Pascalianism -- Intellectual Obligations -- Foresight and Blameworthy Inadvertence to Risk -- Epistemic Blameworthiness Analysed -- Epistemic Autonomy.
520			_aBelieving the wrong thing may sometimes have drastic consequences. The question as to when a person is not only ill-guided, but genuinely at fault for holding a particular belief is an important one: It touches upon the roots of our understanding of such notions as criminal negligence and moral responsibility. The answer to this question may influence the extent to which we are willing to submit each other to punishments ranging from mild resentment to harsh prison terms. This book presents an extensive effort to shed light on the conditions under which we may appropriately deem someone blameworthy for holding a particular belief. It regiments and unifies several debates within contemporary epistemology, ethics and legal scholarship. Finally, the book brings a new philosophical look on issues like our power to control beliefs and the extent and nature of foresight. "Blameworthy Belief is unique in being an up-to-date monograph devoted entirely to the problem of a moral appraisal of beliefs and the closely related problem of deciding to believe (doxastic voluntarism and anti-voluntarism). It is bound to become a highly influential work and is of great interest not only to epistemologists, but also to philosophers of law and moral philosophers." Heinrich Wansing, Professor of Philosophy of Science and Logic, Dresden University of Technology, Germany "Nottelmann has nicely managed to weave accounts of competing views into his discussion, and so this book provides an excellent survey of the literature en route to the development of a sensible account of how we could be said to be responsible for believing various things, even though belief formation is not under our voluntary control." John Heil, Professor of Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis, U.S.A., and Monash University, Australia
590			_aPara consulta fuera de la UANL se requiere clave de acceso remoto.
710	2		_aSpringerLink (Servicio en línea) _9299170
776	0	8	_iEdición impresa: _z9781402059605
856	4	0	_uhttp://remoto.dgb.uanl.mx/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5961-2 _zConectar a Springer E-Books (Para consulta externa se requiere previa autentificación en Biblioteca Digital UANL)
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