000			03256nam a22003855i 4500
001			283119
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007			cr nn 008mamaa
008			150903s2009 ne | o |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9781402087301 _99781402087301
024	7		_a10.1007/9781402087301 _2doi
035			_avtls000336126
039		9	_a201509030818 _bVLOAD _c201404300311 _dVLOAD _y201402041341 _zstaff
040			_aMX-SnUAN _bspa _cMX-SnUAN _erda
050		4	_aK201-487
100	1		_aPeczenik, Aleksander. _eautor _9307594
245	1	0	_aOn Law and Reason / _cby Aleksander Peczenik.
250			_a2.
264		1	_aDordrecht : _bSpringer Netherlands, _c2009.
300			_brecurso en línea.
336			_atexto _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputadora _bc _2rdamedia
338			_arecurso en línea _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_aarchivo de texto _bPDF _2rda
490	0		_aLaw and Philosophy Library, _x1572-4395 ; _v8
500			_aSpringer eBooks
505	0		_aThe Dilemma of Legal Reasoning: Moral Evaluation or Description of the Law? -- Rationality of Moral Judgments -- Rationality of Legal Reasoning -- The Ultimate Justification of Moral and Legal Reasoning -- What is Valid Law? -- The Doctrine of the Sources of the Law -- The Methods of Legal Reasoning.
520			_a'This is an outline of a coherence theory of law. Its basic ideas are: reasonable support and weighing of reasons. All the rest is commentary.’ These words at the beginning of the preface of this book perfectly indicate what On Law and Reason is about. It is a theory about the nature of the law which emphasises the role of reason in the law and which refuses to limit the role of reason to the application of deductive logic. In 1989, when the first edition of On Law and Reason appeared, this book was ground breaking for several reasons. It provided a rationalistic theory of the law in the language of analytic philosophy and based on a thorough understanding of the results, including technical ones, of analytic philosophy. That was not an obvious combination at the time of the book’s first appearance and still is not. The result is an analytical rigor that is usually associated with positivist theories of the law, combined with a philosophical position that is not natural law in a strict sense, but which shares with it the emphasis on the role of reason in determining what the law is. If only for this rare combination, On Law and Reason still deserves careful study. On Law and Reason also foreshadowed and influenced a development in the field of Legal Logic that would take place in the nineties of the 20th century, namely the development of non-monotonic (‘defeasible’) logics for the analysis of legal reasoning. In the new Introduction to this second edition, this aspect is explored in some more detail.
590			_aPara consulta fuera de la UANL se requiere clave de acceso remoto.
710	2		_aSpringerLink (Servicio en línea) _9299170
776	0	8	_iEdición impresa: _z9781402087295
856	4	0	_uhttp://remoto.dgb.uanl.mx/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8730-1 _zConectar a Springer E-Books (Para consulta externa se requiere previa autentificación en Biblioteca Digital UANL)
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999			_c283119 _d283119