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008 | 150903s2007 ne | o |||| 0|eng d | ||
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_a9781402063541 _99781402063541 |
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_a10.1007/9781402063541 _2doi |
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_a201509030239 _bVLOAD _c201404300304 _dVLOAD _y201402041304 _zstaff |
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_aMX-SnUAN _bspa _cMX-SnUAN _erda |
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050 | 4 | _aB67 | |
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_aDilworth, Craig. _eautor _9306925 |
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_aScientific Progress : _bA Study Concerning the Nature of the Relation Between Successive Scientific Theories / _cby Craig Dilworth. |
264 | 1 |
_aDordrecht : _bSpringer Netherlands, _c2007. |
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300 | _brecurso en línea. | ||
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_atexto _btxt _2rdacontent |
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_acomputadora _bc _2rdamedia |
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_arecurso en línea _bcr _2rdacarrier |
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_aarchivo de texto _bPDF _2rda |
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_aSynthese Library ; _v153 |
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500 | _aSpringer eBooks | ||
505 | 0 | _aThe Deductive Model -- The Basis Of The Logical Empiricist Conception Of Science -- The Basis Of The Popperian Conception Of Science -- The Logical Empiricist Conception Of Scientific Progress -- The Popperian Conception Of Scientific Progress -- Popper, Lakatos, And The Transcendence Of The Deductive Model -- Kuhn, Feyerabend, And In Commensurability -- The Gestalt Model -- The Perspectivist Conception Of Science -- Development Of The Perspectivist Conception In The Context Of The Kinetic Theory Of Gases -- The Set-Theoretic Conception Of Science -- Application Of The Perspectivist Conception To The Views Of Newton, Kepler And Galileo. | |
520 | _aKuhn and Feyerabend formulated the problem. Dilworth provides the solution. In this highly original and insightful book, Craig Dilworth answers all the questions raised by the incommensurability thesis. Logical empiricism cannot account for theory conflict. Popperianism cannot account for how one theory is a progression beyond another. Dilworth’s Perspectivist conception of science does both. While remaining within the bounds of classical philosophy of science, Dilworth does away with the logicism of his competitors. On the Perspectivist view theory conflict is not contradiction, and theory superiority does not consist in deductive subsumption or set-theoretic inclusion. Here the relation between theories is analogous to the application of individual concepts, and the question of theory superiority becomes one of relative applicability. In this way Dilworth succeeds in providing a conception of science in which scientific progress is based on both rational and empirical considerations. "[Dilworth] convincingly works out how from his point of view it is possible to explain the conflict between two theories as an incompatibility of perspectives, and at the same time avoid sliding into relativism by giving criteria for scientific progress." Dialectica | ||
590 | _aPara consulta fuera de la UANL se requiere clave de acceso remoto. | ||
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_aSpringerLink (Servicio en línea) _9299170 |
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_iEdición impresa: _z9781402063534 |
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_uhttp://remoto.dgb.uanl.mx/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6354-1 _zConectar a Springer E-Books (Para consulta externa se requiere previa autentificación en Biblioteca Digital UANL) |
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