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020 _a9781402090776
_99781402090776
024 7 _a10.1007/9781402090776
_2doi
035 _avtls000336261
039 9 _a201509030819
_bVLOAD
_c201404300314
_dVLOAD
_y201402041345
_zstaff
040 _aMX-SnUAN
_bspa
_cMX-SnUAN
_erda
050 4 _aBJ1-1725
100 1 _aHaji, Ishtiyaque.
_eautor
_9311080
245 1 0 _aFreedom and Value :
_bFreedom’s Influence on Welfare and Worldly Value /
_cby Ishtiyaque Haji.
264 1 _aDordrecht :
_bSpringer Netherlands,
_c2008.
300 _brecurso en línea.
336 _atexto
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputadora
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _arecurso en línea
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _aarchivo de texto
_bPDF
_2rda
490 0 _aLibrary of Ethics and Applied Philosophy,
_x1387-6678 ;
_v21
500 _aSpringer eBooks
505 0 _aIntroduction: On Welfare and Worldly Value -- Attitudinal Hedonism -- Freedom-Sensitive Versions of Attitudinal Hedonism -- Pleasure, Desert, and Welfare -- Authentic Springs of Action -- Incompatibilism, Compatibilism, Desert, and Value -- Freedom, Obligation, and the Good -- Hard Incompatibilism’s Axiological Costs -- Hard Incompatibilism, Practical Reason, and the Good -- Value, Obligation, and Luck -- Freedom Presuppositions of Preferentism -- Freedom and Whole-Life Satisfaction Theories of Welfare.
520 _aFreedom of the sort implicated in acting freely or with free will is important to the truth of different sorts of moral judgment, such as judgments of moral responsibility and those of moral obligation. Little thought, however, has been invested into whether appraisals of good or evil presuppose free will. This important topic has not commanded the attention it deserves owing to what is perhaps a prevalent assumption that freedom leaves judgments concerning good and evil largely unaffected. The central aim of this book is to dispute this assumption by arguing for the relevance of free will to the truth of two sorts of such judgment: welfare-ranking judgments or judgments of personal well-being (when is one's life intrinsically good for the one who lives it?), and world-ranking judgments (when is a possible world intrinsically better than another?). The book also examines free will’s impact on the truth of such judgments for central issues in moral obligation and in the free will debate. This book should be of interest to those working on intrinsic value, personal well-being, moral obligation, and free will.
590 _aPara consulta fuera de la UANL se requiere clave de acceso remoto.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Servicio en línea)
_9299170
776 0 8 _iEdición impresa:
_z9781402090769
856 4 0 _uhttp://remoto.dgb.uanl.mx/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9077-6
_zConectar a Springer E-Books (Para consulta externa se requiere previa autentificación en Biblioteca Digital UANL)
942 _c14
999 _c283524
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