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001			286512
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007			cr nn 008mamaa
008			150903s2013 xxk| o |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9781447147275 _99781447147275
024	7		_a10.1007/9781447147275 _2doi
035			_avtls000339900
039		9	_a201509030841 _bVLOAD _c201404300406 _dVLOAD _y201402061012 _zstaff
040			_aMX-SnUAN _bspa _cMX-SnUAN _erda
050		4	_aHD9502-9502.5
100	1		_aGullì, Francesco. _eautor _9315172
245	1	0	_aPollution Under Environmental Regulation in Energy Markets / _cby Francesco Gullì.
264		1	_aLondon : _bSpringer London : _bImprint: Springer, _c2013.
300			_aviii, 116 páginas 21 ilustraciones _brecurso en línea.
336			_atexto _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputadora _bc _2rdamedia
338			_arecurso en línea _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_aarchivo de texto _bPDF _2rda
490	0		_aLecture Notes in Energy, _x2195-1284 ; _v6
500			_aSpringer eBooks
505	0		_a1.Introduction and Summary -- 2. Pollution under Hybrid Environmental Regulation: the Case of Space Heating -- 3. Pollution under Environmental Regulation within Multi-period Auctions: the Case of Electricity Markets -- 4. Pollution under Imperfect Competition in Vertical Related Energy Markets.
520			_aPollution Under Environmental Regulation in Energy Markets provides a study of environmental regulation when energy markets are imperfectly competitive. This theoretical treatment focuses on three relevant cases of energy markets. First, the residential space heating sector where hybrid regulation such as taxation and emissions trading together are possible. Second, the electricity market where transactions are organized in the form of multi-period auctions. Third, namely natural gas (input) and electricity (output) markets where there is combined imperfect competition in vertical related energy markets.   The development of free or low carbon technologies supported by energy policies, aiming at increasing security of supply, is also explored whilst considering competition policies that reduce market power in energy markets thus improving market efficiency. Pollution Under Environmental Regulation in Energy Markets discusses the key issues of whether imperfect competition can lessen the ability of environmental policy to reduce pollution and/or to minimize the cost of meeting environmental targets.   Policymakers, analysts and researchers gain a thorough understanding of the performance of environmental policy from Pollution Under Environmental Regulation in Energy Markets leading to better design of simulation models of performance and costs of environmental regulation.
590			_aPara consulta fuera de la UANL se requiere clave de acceso remoto.
710	2		_aSpringerLink (Servicio en línea) _9299170
776	0	8	_iEdición impresa: _z9781447147268
856	4	0	_uhttp://remoto.dgb.uanl.mx/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-4727-5 _zConectar a Springer E-Books (Para consulta externa se requiere previa autentificación en Biblioteca Digital UANL)
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999			_c286512 _d286512