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001 | 291599 | ||
003 | MX-SnUAN | ||
005 | 20170705134223.0 | ||
007 | cr nn 008mamaa | ||
008 | 150903s2007 xxk| o |||| 0|eng d | ||
020 |
_a9781846286360 _99781846286360 |
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024 | 7 |
_a10.1007/9781846286360 _2doi |
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035 | _avtls000343922 | ||
039 | 9 |
_a201509030352 _bVLOAD _c201405050259 _dVLOAD _y201402061243 _zstaff |
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040 |
_aMX-SnUAN _bspa _cMX-SnUAN _erda |
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050 | 4 | _aHB144 | |
100 | 1 |
_aWebb, James N. _eautor _9322974 |
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245 | 1 | 0 |
_aGame Theory : _bDecisions, Interaction and Evolution / _cby James N. Webb. |
264 | 1 |
_aLondon : _bSpringer London, _c2007. |
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300 |
_ax, 242 páginas _brecurso en línea. |
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336 |
_atexto _btxt _2rdacontent |
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337 |
_acomputadora _bc _2rdamedia |
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338 |
_arecurso en línea _bcr _2rdacarrier |
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347 |
_aarchivo de texto _bPDF _2rda |
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490 | 0 |
_aSpringer Undergraduate Mathematics Series, _x1615-2085 |
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500 | _aSpringer eBooks | ||
505 | 0 | _aDecisions -- Simple Decision Models -- Simple Decision Processes -- Markov Decision Processes -- Interaction -- Static Games -- Finite Dynamic Games -- Games with Continuous Strategy Sets -- Infinite Dynamic Games -- Evolution -- Population Games -- Replicator Dynamic. | |
520 | _aThis introduction to game theory is written from a mathematical perspective. Its primary purpose is to be a first course for undergraduate students of mathematics, but it also contains material which will be of interest to advanced students or researchers in biology and economics. The outstanding feature of the book is that it provides a unified account of three types of decision problem: Situations involving a single decision-maker: in which a sequence of choices is to be made in "a game against nature". This introduces the basic ideas of optimality and decision processes. Classical game theory: in which the interactions of two or more decision-makers are considered. This leads to the concept of the Nash equilibrium. Evolutionary game theory: in which the changing structure of a population of interacting decision makers is considered. This leads to the ideas of evolutionarily stable strategies and replicator dynamics. An understanding of basic calculus and probability is assumed but no prior knowledge of game theory is required. Detailed solutions are provided for the numerous exercises. | ||
590 | _aPara consulta fuera de la UANL se requiere clave de acceso remoto. | ||
710 | 2 |
_aSpringerLink (Servicio en línea) _9299170 |
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776 | 0 | 8 |
_iEdición impresa: _z9781846284236 |
856 | 4 | 0 |
_uhttp://remoto.dgb.uanl.mx/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-84628-636-0 _zConectar a Springer E-Books (Para consulta externa se requiere previa autentificación en Biblioteca Digital UANL) |
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