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007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 150903s2007 xxk| o |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9781846286360
_99781846286360
024 7 _a10.1007/9781846286360
_2doi
035 _avtls000343922
039 9 _a201509030352
_bVLOAD
_c201405050259
_dVLOAD
_y201402061243
_zstaff
040 _aMX-SnUAN
_bspa
_cMX-SnUAN
_erda
050 4 _aHB144
100 1 _aWebb, James N.
_eautor
_9322974
245 1 0 _aGame Theory :
_bDecisions, Interaction and Evolution /
_cby James N. Webb.
264 1 _aLondon :
_bSpringer London,
_c2007.
300 _ax, 242 páginas
_brecurso en línea.
336 _atexto
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputadora
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _arecurso en línea
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _aarchivo de texto
_bPDF
_2rda
490 0 _aSpringer Undergraduate Mathematics Series,
_x1615-2085
500 _aSpringer eBooks
505 0 _aDecisions -- Simple Decision Models -- Simple Decision Processes -- Markov Decision Processes -- Interaction -- Static Games -- Finite Dynamic Games -- Games with Continuous Strategy Sets -- Infinite Dynamic Games -- Evolution -- Population Games -- Replicator Dynamic.
520 _aThis introduction to game theory is written from a mathematical perspective. Its primary purpose is to be a first course for undergraduate students of mathematics, but it also contains material which will be of interest to advanced students or researchers in biology and economics. The outstanding feature of the book is that it provides a unified account of three types of decision problem: Situations involving a single decision-maker: in which a sequence of choices is to be made in "a game against nature". This introduces the basic ideas of optimality and decision processes. Classical game theory: in which the interactions of two or more decision-makers are considered. This leads to the concept of the Nash equilibrium. Evolutionary game theory: in which the changing structure of a population of interacting decision makers is considered. This leads to the ideas of evolutionarily stable strategies and replicator dynamics. An understanding of basic calculus and probability is assumed but no prior knowledge of game theory is required. Detailed solutions are provided for the numerous exercises.
590 _aPara consulta fuera de la UANL se requiere clave de acceso remoto.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Servicio en línea)
_9299170
776 0 8 _iEdición impresa:
_z9781846284236
856 4 0 _uhttp://remoto.dgb.uanl.mx/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-84628-636-0
_zConectar a Springer E-Books (Para consulta externa se requiere previa autentificación en Biblioteca Digital UANL)
942 _c14
999 _c291599
_d291599