000			03248nam a22003855i 4500
001			297939
003			MX-SnUAN
005			20160429155441.0
007			cr nn 008mamaa
008			150903s2012 gw | o |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9783540786368 _99783540786368
024	7		_a10.1007/9783540786368 _2doi
035			_avtls000351681
039		9	_a201509030929 _bVLOAD _c201405060254 _dVLOAD _y201402171143 _zstaff
040			_aMX-SnUAN _bspa _cMX-SnUAN _erda
050		4	_aQA76.9.D35
100	1		_aCremers, Cas. _eautor _9333951
245	1	0	_aOperational Semantics and Verification of Security Protocols / _cby Cas Cremers, Sjouke Mauw.
264		1	_aBerlin, Heidelberg : _bSpringer Berlin Heidelberg : _bImprint: Springer, _c2012.
300			_axiii, 172 páginas 59 ilustraciones _brecurso en línea.
336			_atexto _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputadora _bc _2rdamedia
338			_arecurso en línea _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_aarchivo de texto _bPDF _2rda
490	0		_aInformation Security and Cryptography, _x1619-7100
500			_aSpringer eBooks
505	0		_aIntroduction -- Preliminaries -- Operational Semantics -- Security Properties -- Verification -- Multiprotocol Attacks -- Generalizing NSL for Multiparty Authentication -- Related Work -- Conclusions and Future Work -- Index.
520			_aSecurity protocols are widely used to ensure secure communications over insecure networks, such as the internet or airwaves. These protocols use strong cryptography to prevent intruders from reading or modifying the messages. However, using cryptography is not enough to ensure their correctness. Combined with their typical small size, which suggests that one could easily assess their correctness, this often results in incorrectly designed protocols. The authors present a methodology for formally describing security protocols and their environment. This methodology includes a model for describing protocols, their execution model, and the intruder model. The models are extended with a number of well-defined security properties, which capture the notions of correct protocols, and secrecy of data. The methodology can be used to prove that protocols satisfy these properties. Based on the model they have developed a tool set called Scyther that can automatically find attacks on security protocols or prove their correctness. In case studies they show the application of the methodology as well as the effectiveness of the analysis tool. The methodology’s strong mathematical basis, the strong separation of concerns in the model, and the accompanying tool set make it ideally suited both for researchers and graduate students of information security or formal methods and for advanced professionals designing critical security protocols.
590			_aPara consulta fuera de la UANL se requiere clave de acceso remoto.
700	1		_aMauw, Sjouke. _eautor _9333952
710	2		_aSpringerLink (Servicio en línea) _9299170
776	0	8	_iEdición impresa: _z9783540786351
856	4	0	_uhttp://remoto.dgb.uanl.mx/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78636-8 _zConectar a Springer E-Books (Para consulta externa se requiere previa autentificación en Biblioteca Digital UANL)
942			_c14
999			_c297939 _d297939