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001			299574
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008			150903s2009 gw | o |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9783540927518 _99783540927518
024	7		_a10.1007/9783540927518 _2doi
035			_avtls000352674
039		9	_a201509030922 _bVLOAD _c201405060309 _dVLOAD _y201402180925 _zstaff
040			_aMX-SnUAN _bspa _cMX-SnUAN _erda
100	1		_aCarlberg, Michael. _eautor _9327781
245	1	0	_aStrategic Policy Interactions in a Monetary Union / _cby Michael Carlberg.
264		1	_aBerlin, Heidelberg : _bSpringer Berlin Heidelberg, _c2009.
300			_brecurso en línea.
336			_atexto _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputadora _bc _2rdamedia
338			_arecurso en línea _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_aarchivo de texto _bPDF _2rda
500			_aSpringer eBooks
505	0		_aThe Monetary Union as a Whole:Absence of a Deficit Target -- Monetary Policy A -- Monetary Policy B -- Fiscal Policy A -- Fiscal Policy B -- Interaction between Central Bank and Government -- Cooperation between Central Bank and Government -- Interaction between Central Bank and Government:A Special Case -- The Monetary Union as a Whole:Presence of a Deficit Target -- Fiscal Policy A -- Fiscal Policy B -- Interaction between Central Bank and Government A -- Interaction between Central Bank and Government B -- Interaction between Central Bank and Government C -- Cooperation between Central Bank and Government -- The Monetary Union of Two Countries:Absence of a Deficit Target. -- Monetary Policy in Europe A -- Monetary Policy in Europe B -- Fiscal Policy in Germany A -- Fiscal Policy in Germany B -- Interaction between European Central Bank,German Government, and French Government -- Cooperation between European Central Bank,German Government, and French Government -- The Monetary Union of Two Countries:Presence of a Deficit Target -- Fiscal Policy in Germany A -- Fiscal Policy in Germany B -- Interaction between European Central Bank,German Government, and French Government A -- Interaction between European Central Bank,German Government, and French Government B -- Interaction between European Central Bank,German Government, and French Government C -- Cooperation between European Central Bank,German Government, and French Government -- Synopsis -- Conclusion -- Result.
520			_aThis book studies the strategic policy interactions in a monetary union. The leading protagonists are the European Central Bank and national governments. The target of the ECB is low inflation in Europe. The targets of a national government are low unemployment and a low structural deficit. There are demand shocks, supply shocks, and mixed shocks. There are country-specific shocks and common shocks. This book develops a series of basic, intermediate, and more advanced models. Here the focus is on the Nash equilibrium. The key questions are: Given a shock, can policy interactions reduce the existing loss? And to what extent can they do so? Another topical issue is policy cooperation. To illustrate all of this there are a lot of numerical examples.
590			_aPara consulta fuera de la UANL se requiere clave de acceso remoto.
710	2		_aSpringerLink (Servicio en línea) _9299170
776	0	8	_iEdición impresa: _z9783540927501
856	4	0	_uhttp://remoto.dgb.uanl.mx/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92751-8 _zConectar a Springer E-Books (Para consulta externa se requiere previa autentificación en Biblioteca Digital UANL)
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999			_c299574 _d299574