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001			301483
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007			cr nn 008mamaa
008			150903s2013 gw | o |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9783642142000 _99783642142000
024	7		_a10.1007/9783642142000 _2doi
035			_avtls000355354
039		9	_a201509030954 _bVLOAD _c201405060349 _dVLOAD _y201402191041 _zstaff
040			_aMX-SnUAN _bspa _cMX-SnUAN _erda
050		4	_aHB135-147
100	1		_aCvitani?, Jakša. _eautor _9339356
245	1	0	_aContract Theory in Continuous-Time Models / _cby Jakša Cvitani?, Jianfeng Zhang.
264		1	_aBerlin, Heidelberg : _bSpringer Berlin Heidelberg : _bImprint: Springer, _c2013.
300			_axii, 255 páginas _brecurso en línea.
336			_atexto _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputadora _bc _2rdamedia
338			_arecurso en línea _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_aarchivo de texto _bPDF _2rda
490	0		_aSpringer Finance, _x1616-0533
500			_aSpringer eBooks
505	0		_aPreface -- PART I Introduction: 1.The Principal-Agent Problem -- 2.Single-Period Examples -- PART II First Best. Risk Sharing under Full Information: 3.Linear Models with Project Selection, and Preview of Results -- 4.The General Risk Sharing Problem -- PART III Second Best. Contracting Under Hidden Action- The Case of Moral Hazard: 5.The General Moral Hazard Problem -- 6.DeMarzo and Sannikov (2007), Biais et al (2007) – An Application to Capital Structure Problems: Optimal Financing of a Company -- PART IV Third Best. Contracting Under Hidden Action and Hidden Type – The Case of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: 7.Controlling the Drift -- 8.Controlling the Volatility-Drift Trade-Off with the First-Best -- PART IV Appendix: Backward SDEs and Forward-Backward SDEs -- 9.Introduction -- 10.Backward SDEs -- 11.Decoupled Forward Backward SDEs -- 12.Coupled Forward Backward SDEs -- References -- Index.
520			_aIn recent years there has been a significant increase of interest in continuous-time Principal-Agent models, or contract theory, and their applications. Continuous-time models provide a powerful and elegant framework for solving stochastic optimization problems of finding the optimal contracts between two parties, under various assumptions on the information they have access to, and the effect they have on the underlying "profit/loss" values. This monograph surveys recent results of the theory in a systematic way, using the approach of the so-called Stochastic Maximum Principle, in models driven by Brownian Motion. Optimal contracts are characterized via a system of Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equations. In a number of interesting special cases these can be solved explicitly, enabling derivation of many qualitative economic conclusions.
590			_aPara consulta fuera de la UANL se requiere clave de acceso remoto.
700	1		_aZhang, Jianfeng. _eautor _9339357
710	2		_aSpringerLink (Servicio en línea) _9299170
776	0	8	_iEdición impresa: _z9783642141997
856	4	0	_uhttp://remoto.dgb.uanl.mx/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14200-0 _zConectar a Springer E-Books (Para consulta externa se requiere previa autentificación en Biblioteca Digital UANL)
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999			_c301483 _d301483