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020 _a9789400721876
_99789400721876
024 7 _a10.1007/9789400721876
_2doi
035 _avtls000366782
039 9 _a201509030705
_bVLOAD
_c201405070432
_dVLOAD
_y201402251345
_zstaff
040 _aMX-SnUAN
_bspa
_cMX-SnUAN
_erda
050 4 _aB108-5802
100 1 _aRocknak, Stefanie.
_eautor
_9354121
245 1 0 _aImagined Causes: Hume's Conception of Objects /
_cby Stefanie Rocknak.
264 1 _aDordrecht :
_bSpringer Netherlands :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2013.
300 _axvI, 289 páginas 10 ilustraciones
_brecurso en línea.
336 _atexto
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputadora
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _arecurso en línea
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _aarchivo de texto
_bPDF
_2rda
490 0 _aThe New Synthese Historical Library ;
_v71
500 _aSpringer eBooks
505 0 _aGeneral Introduction.- PART I: LAYING THE GROUNDWORK.- 1. Four Distinctions.- 2. Elementary Belief, Causally-Produced Belief and the Natural Relation of Causality -- 3. The Two Systems of Reality -- PART II: PERFECT IDENTITY AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL IMAGINATION -- 4. Proto-Objects -- 5. The First Account of Transcendental Perfect Identity: The Foundation of Secret Causes -- 6. A Mysterious Kind of Causation: The Second Account of Transcendental Perfect Identity -- 7. Unity, Number and Time: The Third Account of Transcendental Perfect Identity.- PART III: IMAGINING CAUSES IN REACTION TO THE VULGAR: A PURELY PHILOSOPHICAL ENDEAVOR -- 8. The Vulgar Attempt to Achieve Perfect Identity -- 9. The Philosopher’s Reaction to the Vulgar: Imagined Causes Revisited -- 10. Personal Identity.- PART IV: JUSTIFICATION -- 11. Three Unjustified Instances of Imagined Causes: Substances, Primary Qualities and the Soul as an Immaterial Object -- 12. Conclusion.- Bibliography -- Index.
520 _aThis book provides the first comprehensive account of Hume’s conception of objects in Book I of A Treatise of Human Nature. What, according to Hume, are objects? Ideas? Impressions? Mind-independent objects? All three? None of the above? Through a close textual analysis, Rocknak shows that Hume thought that objects are imagined ideas. But, she argues, he struggled with two accounts of how and when we imagine such ideas. On the one hand, Hume believed that we always and universally imagine that objects are the causes of our perceptions. On the other hand, he thought that we only imagine such causes when we reach a “philosophical” level of thought. This tension manifests itself in Hume’s account of personal identity; a tension that, Rocknak argues, Hume acknowledges in the Appendix to the Treatise. As a result of Rocknak’s detailed account of Hume’s conception of objects, we are forced to accommodate new interpretations of, at least, Hume’s notions of belief, personal identity, justification and causality.
590 _aPara consulta fuera de la UANL se requiere clave de acceso remoto.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Servicio en línea)
_9299170
776 0 8 _iEdición impresa:
_z9789400721869
856 4 0 _uhttp://remoto.dgb.uanl.mx/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2187-6
_zConectar a Springer E-Books (Para consulta externa se requiere previa autentificación en Biblioteca Digital UANL)
942 _c14
999 _c312427
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